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TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION:
COMMUNITY-WIDE OR INTERNATIONAL?
THE SAGA CONTINUES
IRENE CALBOLI*
I. INTRODUCTION
While the exclusive rights of use of a trademark entitle an owner to
prevent third parties from using identical or similar marks in relation to
identical or similar products without his consent, these rights are qualified by
the principle of “exhaustion,” also known as the “first-sale rule.”1 According
to this principle, “[t]he right of a producer to control distribution of its
trademarked products does not extend beyond the first sale of the product,”
and “[r]esale by the first purchaser of the original article under the producer‟s
trademark is neither trademark infringement nor unfair competition.”2 These

*
Dr. Calboli is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at Marquette University Law School and a
Research Fellow at Bologna University Law School. She holds an LL.B. and a Doctorate Degree in
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law from Bologna University Law School and an
L.L.M from the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London. Dr.
Calboli would like to thank Professor Vito M. Mangini, Bologna University Law School, and Dr.
Spyros M. Maniatis, Queen Mary & Westfield College, University of London, for their help and
comments during the preparation of this Article. Additional thanks are due to Dean Howard
Eisenberg and Associate Dean Shirley Wiegand, Marquette University Law School, and the
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review staff, and especially Peter T. Holsen, Editor-in-Chief.
1. See generally Herman Cohen Jehoram, Prohibition of Parallel Imports Through
Intellectual Property Rights, 30 I.I.C. 495 (1999); Roland Michael Beckmann, Die Reichweite des
Erschöpfungsgrundsatzes nach neuem Markenrecht, 11 G.R.U.R. INT‟L 836 (1998); Gallus Joller,
Zur territorialen Reichweite des Erschöpfungsgrundsatzes im Markenrecht, 10 G.R.U.R. INT‟L 751
(1998); Gallus Joller, Markenrecht und freier Warenverkehr, 4 G.R.U.R. INT‟L 309 (1998);
Christopher Heath, Parallel Imports and International Trade, 28 I.I.C. 623 (1997); Ulrich
Löwenheim, Nationale und Internationale Erschöpfung von Schutzrechten im Wandel der Zeiten, 4
G.R.U.R. INT‟L 307 (1996); Charles Worth, Free Trade Agreements and the Exhaustion of Rights
Principle, 1 E.I.P.R. 40 (1994); John C. Hilke, Free Trading or Free-Riding: An Examination of the
Theories and Available Empirical Evidence on Gray Market Imports, 1988 WORLD COMPETITION
75; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979);
Friedrich-Karl Beier, Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade, 1 I.I.C. 48 (1970).
2. Sebastian Int‟l v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1720, 1722 (9th Cir. 1995), quoted in J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION 25:41 (2001). According to the Ninth Circuit, “the premise of the first sale is
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limits on exclusive trademark rights are founded in the interests of free trade
and the free movement of goods. Such limits are justified by the concept that
trademarks must not be used as tools of distribution, marketing policy, or as a
means for market division, in a way that counters their function as distinctive
indicators of origin.3
From a legal standpoint, the definition of an exhaustion regime depends
upon the recognition of this principle by national trademark laws and upon the
determination of the geographical area over which the principle is to apply.4
Traditionally, national practices have been characterized by two distinct
approaches: “national exhaustion” and “international exhaustion.”5
Under national exhaustion, once the trademarked products are placed on
the market by the owner, or with his consent, the owner‟s rights are
considered exhausted only in the domestic territory. The owner will still be
free to oppose the importation of genuine goods bearing his trademark that
have been put on the market outside the domestic territory.6 In contrast, under
international exhaustion, if a trademark owner, or someone with his consent,
places the trademarked goods on the market in any of the national
jurisdictions where the trademark owner enjoys protection, the owner‟s rights
are exhausted in other national jurisdictions where he enjoys similar rights.

that „the consumer gets exactly what the consumer bargains for, the genuine product of the particular
producer.‟” MCCARTHY, supra, § 25:41 n.4 (quoting Sebastian, 53 F.3d at 1075 (2001)).
3. Even though trademarks perform a variety of functions in modern society, their primary
function, from a legal standpoint, is still as indicators of commercial origin. See generally W. R.
CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 612 (4th ed. 1996); Spyros M. Maniatis, Competition and the
Economics of Trade Marks, in ADRAIN STERLING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & MARKET FREEDOM
65 (London, Sweet & Maxwell 1997); Anselm Kamperman Sanders & Spyros M. Maniatis, A
Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based on Origin and Quality, 11 E.I.P.R. 406 (1993); Nicholas S.
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523 (1988); Sidney A. Diamond,
The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975); Frank I. Schechter,
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927) (stating that the “proper
function of a trademark” is “to identify the origin or ownership of goods to which it is affixed”). This
is reflected in most modern trademark legislation and has been affirmed in the wording of Directive
89/104/EEC (recital 10th to the Directive states that “the function [of a trademark] is in particular to
guarantee the trademark as an indicator of origin”) and in the European Court of Justice‟s case law.
See Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 1997 E.C.R. I-6191 and Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki
Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 1999 R.P.C. 117.
4. See S. K. Verma, Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade—Article 6 of
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 I.I.C. 534, 539 (1998).
5. On the differences between national and international exhaustion, see generally Jesper
Rasmussen, The Principle of Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights Pursuant to Directive 89/104 (and
Regulation 40/94), 4 E.I.P.R. 174 (1995); Herman Cohen Jehoram, International Exhaustion versus
Importation Right: A Murky Area of Intellectual Property Law, 4 G.R.U.R. INT‟L 280 (1996).
6. Verma, supra note 4, at 539. On the difference between importation of genuine goods and
of materially different products, see MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 29:46, :48 to :50, :51.2.
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Accordingly, the trademark owner will not be free to prevent international
importation of genuine products bearing his trademark.7
Because of its impact on the control of economic distribution, issues
regarding trademark exhaustion have been at the center of discussion in
Europe since the adoption of the Treaty of Rome. In the formative years of
the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Community
Commission (the “Commission”) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
argued that the exclusive rights afforded by national laws to trademark owners
could be an obstacle to the creation of a unified internal market. This resulted
in the development of the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion,8 a
regional compromise between national and international exhaustion.
According to the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion, once a product
has been put on the market in a particular Member State, by or with the
consent of the legitimate trademark owner, the owner can no longer rely on
his national rights to prevent the importation of the product from that State
into another Member State.
To approximate the laws of Member States relating to trademarks, the
Community-wide exhaustion criterion was eventually incorporated into
Article 7(1) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of December 21, 1988
(the “Trademark Directive”).9 The adoption of the Agreement for the

7. Verma, supra note 4, at 539.
8. On the development of the principle of Community-wide exhaustion, see generally,
Herman Cohen Jehoram, Harmonising Intellectual Property Law Within the European Community,
23 I.I.C. 622 (1992); Friedrich-Karl Beier, Industrial Property and the Free Movement of Goods in
the Internal European Market, 21 I.I.C. 131 (1990); Vito M. Mangini, Competition and Monopoly in
Trademark Law: An EEC Perspective, 11 I.I.C. 591 (1980); Friedrich-Karl Beier, The Doctrine of
Exhaustion in EEC Trademark Law—Scope and Limits, 10 I.I.C. 20 (1979); Friedrich-Karl Beier,
Trademark Conflicts in the Common Market: Can They be Solved by Means of Distinguishing
Additions?, 9 I.I.C. 221 (1978); Ulrich Löwenheim, Trademark and European Community Law, 9
I.I.C. 422 (1978); Lord Mackenzie Stuart, The Function of Trade Marks and the Free Movement of
Goods in the European Economic Community, 7 I.I.C. 27 (1976); Willem Mak, Trademarks and the
European Common Market, 6 I.I.C. 29 (1975). The ECJ developed the principle of Community-wide
exhaustion independently of the exhaustion regimes adopted by European Member States at the
national level. The laws of some countries, such as Germany, the Benelux Countries, Austria,
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, generally accepted the principle of “international exhaustion,” while
other European jurisdictions, such as France, Italy, and Spain, opted for the principle of “national
exhaustion.”
9. Council Directive 89/104/EEC was adopted by the European Council on December, 21
1988 after almost ten years of debate. The first draft of the Directive was published in December
1980. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1980 O.J. (C 351/1). An attempted “final proposal” was
submitted to the Council in December of 1985. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1985 O.J. (C 215/4).
Following the comments of several Member States, a new text was drafted in October 1986 and
discussed by the Working Group. In December 1987 an amended text, strongly influenced by the
Dutch delegation, was published and subsequently approved by the Council in June of 1988.
Following the advice of the Economic and Social Committee in October of 1988 and the Opinion of
the European Parliament in December of 1988, the Council adopted the Trademark Directive on
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European Economic Area (EEA) of May 2, 1992 extended this principle to
the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) countries joining the EEA
(Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein).10
However, it is unclear from the wording of the Trademark Directive
whether the principle of Community-wide (now EEA-wide) exhaustion only
represents a minimum standard that leaves Member States free to apply more
generous rules (i.e., international exhaustion), or whether Community-wide
exhaustion should be applied as the general criterion to all intra-EEA trade.
To settle this ambiguity, the ECJ interpreted Article 7(1) of the Trademark
Directive in two recent cases: Silhouette International Schmied v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft11 in 1998 and Sebago Inc. et. al. v. GB-Unic SA12 in
1999. The ECJ ruled that the Trademark Directive precludes national rules
that provide for international exhaustion of trademark rights.13 Nevertheless,
after considering the strong pressures coming from some Member States in
favor of international exhaustion, the ECJ suggested that a possible remedy
could be “to extend the exhaustion provided for by Article 7 to products put
on the market in non-member countries by entering into international
agreements in that sphere, as was done in the context of the EEA
Agreement.”14 As has been noticed, such compromise could come under the
scope of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement as a violation of
the principle of “Most Favored Nation Treatment,” as per Article 4 of the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS).15

December 21, 1988. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 40/1). For a detailed analysis of
the Commission‟s working documents with special attention to the drafting of Article 7, see Cohen
Jehoram, supra note 1, at 501.
10. Annex XVII and Article 2(1) of the Protocol to the Agreement for the European
Economic Area (O.J.E.C. L 1/3, January 3, 1994) extended the effect of Article 7 of the Trademark
Directive to the EEA from January 1, 1994.
11. Case C-355/96, 1998 E.T.M.R. 539, available at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp (last visited May
3, 2002).
12. Case C-173/98, 2 C.M.L.R. 1317 (1999).
13. Id.
14. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at ¶ 30.
15. See Verma, supra note 4, at 557; Stanislaw Soltysinsky, International Exhaustion of
Intellectual Property Rights Under the TRIPS, the EC Law and the Europe Agreements, 4 G.R.U.R.
INT‟L 316 (1996). Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement states that “with regard to the protection of
intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the
nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of
all other Members.” GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
1994, art. 6. The concern that negotiation of reciprocity agreements for the purpose of trademark
exhaustion can come under the scope of the WTO Agreement has also been recently expressed by the
Commission. See generally Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights: Working Document from the
Commission Services, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/intprop/indprop/exhaust.htm
(December 9, 1999) [hereinafter Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion].
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The debate on the issue was reignited by the 1999 High Court of London
decisions in Zino Davidoff S.A. v. AG Imports Ltd. 16 and Levi Strauss & Co.
v. Tesco Stores Ltd.17 These cases introduced elements of the law of contracts
and the sale of goods, and private international law into the debate. Despite
pressure from some Member States, in its November 2001 judgment in Zino
Davidoff, the ECJ has continued to prevent any change towards international
exhaustion.18
The issue of trademark exhaustion has also been the subject of discussion
within European institutions and among private trade organizations. In April
1999, the Commission organized two meetings with interested parties in order
to discuss possible changes to the current regime. As a result of these
consultations, the Commission concluded that a shift towards international
exhaustion would not, at least in short term, lead to a significant reduction in
prices for consumers and decided that such a change was not appropriate for
the time being.19 In March 2001, however, the European Parliament took an
opposite approach and published a draft report on the issue, advocating the
transition to international exhaustion.20 Thus far, no relevant legislative
measures have been adopted and the debate on the issue is still open.21
Following the recent ECJ case law, and in light of the overall debate on
the issue, this Study analyzes whether, and under what conditions, a shift
towards a regime of international exhaustion in Europe could still be possible.
This Study focuses on an analysis of trademark exhaustion within the
meaning of the Trademark Directive. It does not elaborate on other issues,
such as competition or questions on vertical restraints that are also relevant in
the larger context of parallel trade.22 First, this Study will offer a description
16. 30 I.I.C. 567 (1999) [hereinafter Zino Davidoff].
17. Unreported.
18. Joined Cases C-414-416/99, Zino Davidoff SA v. A & G Imports Ltd, Levi Strauss & Co.
v. Tesco Stores Ltd., and Levi Strauss & Co. v. Costco Wholesale UK Ltd. (Nov. 20, 2001),
available at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp [hereinafter Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases
C-414-416/99)].
19. For a summary of these meetings, see Commission Working Paper on Trademark
Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 17-19. Further updates on the issue are available at the Commission‟s
web site at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop.
20. This unreported text was drafted by delegation members from Member States in favor of
international exhaustion.
21. On October 3, 2001, the European Parliament voted 473 to 22 (with 27 abstentions) in
favor of a resolution providing for the creation of another Commission working paper about the
exhaustion of trademark rights. A provisional edition of the minutes of the Parliament‟s resolution
(SEC(1999)2033 - C5-0354/2000 - 2187/2000(COS)) is available at the Community Parliament‟s
web site (through a search in the Legislative Observatory using the Rapporteur‟s name: Mayer HansPeter) at http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil (last visited May 22, 2002).
22. From the ECJ‟s judgment in Case C-306/96, Javico Int‟l & Javico AG v. Yves Saint
Laurent Parfums SA, 1998 E.C.R. I-1983, it is clear that parallel imports from a third country may,
under certain circumstances, be acceptable under European Union competition rules. See
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of the development of the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion and of the
relevant rulings of the ECJ before the adoption of the Trademark Directive.
Next, this Study will focus on the interpretive problems of Article 7(1) of the
Trademark Directive that have characterized the provision so far, and will
analyze the ECJ rulings in Silhouette23 and Sebago.24 Finally, it will refer to
the recent consultations organized by the Commission and the European
Parliament, and to the ECJ ruling in Zino Davidoff25 and Levi Strauss,26 in
order to draw conclusions as to the possibility of a change towards a regime of
international exhaustion.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF
COMMUNITY-WIDE EXHAUSTION
So far, the position adopted by the Community regarding the exhaustion
of intellectual property rights has been different from other jurisdictions.
Clearly inspired by economic liberalization, but mainly at the Community
level, the main goal was to integrate national markets and to create a unified
European internal market.27 During the years that followed the adoption of
the Treaty of Rome, the Commission and the ECJ argued that the exclusive
powers afforded by national law to the holder of an intellectual property right
could not be considered “indispensable for its protection.” Therefore, they
argued against absolute territorial protection to prevent the hindrance of
parallel importation within the Community. To this end, the ECJ initially
prohibited the exclusive use of intellectual property rights by application of
the rules of competition set by the European Community Treaty (EC
Treaty).28 Since the early 1970s, the ECJ relied more frequently on the

Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 1. For a position in favor
of international trademark exhaustion because of its effects on free trade and world-wide
competition, see Irini A. Stamatoudi & Paul L.C. Torremans, International Exhaustion in the
European Union in the Light of ―Zino Davidoff‖: Contract Versus Trade Mark Law?, 31 I.I.C. 123,
140 (2000); W. R. Cornish, Trade Marks: Portcullis for the EEA?, [1998] E.I.P.R. 174, 176.
23. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at 539.
24. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. at 1317.
25. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. 567 (1999).
26. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), supra note 18.
27. Verma, supra note 4, at 546; Cohen Jehoram, supra note 5, at 282.
28. The ECJ applied the EC antitrust provisions in the leading case Costen & Grunding v. EC
Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299. Article 81 (ex. Article 85) of the EC Treaty states that “[t]he
following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market.” TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C340) (Final) (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. Article 82 (ex.
Article 86) provides: “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common

2002]

TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION

53

principle of the free movement of goods, as settled in Articles 28 and 30 of
the EC Treaty, in order to achieve the most awaited market integration.29
Article 28 of the EC Treaty prohibits quantitative restrictions on
importation between Member States, and other measures having an
“equivalent effect,” in order to ensure the free movement of goods within the
European internal market.30 The ECJ has held repeatedly that national
intellectual property rights that were directed to prevent acts of importation
may amount to measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restriction.31
Accordingly, actions enforcing exclusive rights should not be allowed to
succeed unless the actions are justified by Article 30 of the EC Treaty, which
allows Member States to apply their national laws when protecting intellectual
property rights.32 Furthermore, the ECJ has traditionally overruled national
laws governing intellectual property rights when those laws would empower
trademark owners to prevent parallel importation within the Community, and
argued that the second part of Article 30 provides that domestic laws should
not provide a means of “arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction of
trade between Member States.”33
market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.” Id. at art. 82. According to both
provisions, anti-competitive behavior can consist, in particular, in
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of
contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
Id.
29. For a detailed reconstruction of the ECJ‟s case law, see Guy Tritton, Articles 30 to 36 and
Intellectual Property: Is the Jurisprudence of the ECJ now of an Ideal Standard?, 10 E.I.P.R. 472
(1994).
30. Article 28 (ex. Article 30) of the EC Treaty states that “[q]uantitative restriction on
imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.” EC
TREATY art. 28.
31. Verma, supra note 4, at 546.
32. Article 30 of the EC Treaty provides that
[t]he provisions of Article 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or
public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the
protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall
not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States.
EC TREATY art. 30.
On the extent of this provision, see Bryan Harris, The Application of Article 36 to Intellectual
Property (a Review of the Case Law), 1 EUR. L. REV. 515 (1976).
33. Verma, supra note 4, at 546 (quoting EC TREATY art. 30). For further references see also
supra note 8.
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These principles constitute the foundations of the doctrine of Communitywide exhaustion and have been developed by the ECJ in several leading cases.
A. Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. Metro Grossmarket
In Deutsche Grammophon,34 the ECJ ruled for the first time that the
exercise, by the owner of an intellectual property right, of the right enjoyed
under the domestic law of a Member State to prohibit the sale in that state of a
product protected by that right and marketed in another Member State by him
or with his consent, was incompatible with the EC Treaty rule on the free
movement of goods in the common market. The ECJ analyzed the scope of
Article 30 of the EC Treaty in order to overcome the argument that the
provision allows restrictions on the free movement of goods for the protection
of “industrial and commercial property.”35 The ECJ drew a distinction
between the “existence” of the intellectual property rights and their
“exercise.”36 While the existence of the exclusive right is determined by
respective national laws, its exercise should be consistent with the EC
Treaty.37 Accordingly, a restriction under Article 30 could only be justified to
the extent that it aims to safeguard the “specific subject matter” of the
intellectual property right at issue.
B. Centrafarm v. Winthrop
In relation to trademarks, the ECJ clarified the meaning of the exclusive
right‟s specific subject-matter in Centrafarm v. Winthrop.38 According to the
ECJ, trademark rights
guarantee that the owner of the mark has the exclusive right to use the
mark, for the purpose of putting products protected by the trade mark
into [the market] for the first time, and therefore was intended to
protect him against competitors wishing to take advantage of the
status and reputation of the trade mark by selling products illegally
bearing that trade mark.39

34. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarket GmbH,
1971 E.C.R. 487. The distinction between the “existence” and the “exercise” of intellectual property
rights arises from Costen & Grunding v. EC Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299. For further analysis, see
Georges Friden, Recent Developments in EEC Intellectual Property Law: The Distinction Between
Existence and Exercise Revisited, 26 C.M.L.R. 193 (1989).
35. Friden, supra note 34, at 193.
36. Id. at 194.
37. Id.
38. Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV v.Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183.
39. Id. at 1194. The Court confirmed its view in Case 3/78, Centrafarm BV v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp., 1978 E.C.R. 183 and Case 1/81, Pfizer Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 1981 E.C.R. 2913.
See Bryan Harris, The ―Exhaustion Principle‖ and the Centrafarm Case, 4 EUR. L. REV. 379 (1979).
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As a result, in the case of parallel importation by independent parties
within the Community, the ECJ held that the invocation of the right of
exclusivity did not fall within the specific subject matter of trademark rights,
as long as the products in question were put into the market of the Member
State from which they were imported by the trademark owner or with his
consent.40
C. Van Zuylen v. Hag
In the 1970s, the ECJ was at the height of its efforts to rid the common
market of intellectual property subdivision. In a 1973 case, VanZulen v. Hag,
also known as “Hag I,”41 the ECJ developed the doctrine of “common origin”
as a complement to the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion. According
to this principle, when marks at issue were “sharing the same origin,” it was
incompatible with Articles 28 and 30 of the EC Treaty to prohibit the trading
of the trademarked product in a Member State that was lawfully registered in
another Member State because an identical trademark registration already
existed in the first state.42 Hag I concerned two trademark registrations in
Belgium and Germany for the decaffeinated coffee “Hag.”43 Before World
War II, both registrations were owned by the same German company; but
after the war, the Belgium registration was confiscated by the Belgian
government and eventually sold to a local independent company, Van Zuylen
Freres.44 According to the ECJ, in spite of the facts that the two registrations
were actually owned by different companies and that Van Zuylen had the
exclusive right on the trademark in Belgium, their shared “origin” was
sufficient to allow importation into Belgium of German products bearing the
trademark “Hag.”45
The ECJ ruling in Hag I was heavily criticized. It was argued that the
ECJ had failed to address the essential function of a trademark, that is, to
indicate the origin of a product in order to prevent any likelihood of confusion
on the part of the public.46 Like the facts of Hag I, when two identical
40. On these aspects, see CORNISH, supra note 3, at 646; Eike Ullmann, Reconciling Trade
Mark Decisions of National Courts and the European Court of Justice, 27 I.I.C. 791 (1996); INGE
GOVAERE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN E.C. LAW 157 (1996);
Ulrich Löwenheim, Intellectual Property Before the European Court of Justice, 26 I.I.C. 829 (1995);
Giuliano Marenco & Karen Banks, Intellectual Property and the Community Rules on Free
Movement: Discrimination Unearthed, 15 EUR. L. REV. 224 (1990).
41. Case 192/73, Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. 731.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. For a detailed analysis of the criticisms expressed by the European legal doctrine, see
supra note 8. For a discussion on Trademark functions, see supra note 3.

56

MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

trademark registrations are owned by different economic entities in different
Member States, the ECJ could not use the free movement of goods as a
pretext to prevent the enforcement of the legitimate owner‟s exclusive rights
against the importation of similar products bearing identical trademarks from
another Member State. This would be contrary to the “specific subject
matter” of a trademark as affirmed by the ECJ,47 and as a result would
illegitimately deprive trademark owners of their exclusive rights.
In light of these criticisms, two years later the ECJ drew back from its
ruling in Hag I with its decision in Terrapin Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A.
Kapferer & Co.48 The ECJ held that Hag I’s “common origin” doctrine had
been applied in a special case.49
D. CNL-Sucal v. Hag GF
In 1989, fifteen years after the decision in “Hag I,” the ECJ reversed itself
in S.A. CNL-Sucal v. Hag Gf AG.50 This case, known as “Hag II,” had
identical facts as Hag I. The ECJ confirmed that the essential function of a
trademark, the function of indicator of commercial origin, would be
compromised if trademark owners were not able to prevent the importation of
products bearing marks that are identical to, or likely to be confused with,
their own trademarks.51 Accordingly, and in spite of their “common origins,”
two identical national registrations in different Member States can
legitimately prevent the importation of trademarked products from and to
these Member States.
E. IHT Internationale Heiztechnik v. Ideal-Standard
In 1994, the ECJ confirmed this line of reasoning in IHT Internationale
Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH.52 Hag I and Hag II addressed
the situation in which a trademark right had originally been in common
ownership and then had been divided “involuntarily” through confiscation,
without the original owner‟s consent. IHT concerned a voluntary assignment
of the trademark “Ideal Standard” to one member of the IHT group, without
the consent of the other.53 According to the ECJ, such an assignment did not

47. Van Zuylen Freres, 1974 E.C.R. 731.
48. Case 119/75, 1976 E.C.R. 1039.
49. Id. at 1062.
50. Case C-10/89, 1990 E.C.R. I-3711.
51. Warwick A. Rothnie, Hag II: Putting the Common Origin Doctrine to Sleep, 1 E.I.P.R. 24
(1991); Rene Joliet & David T. Keeling, Trade Mark Law and the Free Movement of Goods: The
Overruling of the Judgement in Hag I, 22 I.I.C. 303 (1991).
52. Case C-9/93, 1994 E.C.R. I-2782.
53. Id. at I-2782 to 783.
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exhaust the trademark rights of the whole group.54 In particular, the ECJ held
that the principle of exhaustion only applied
where the owner of the trade mark in the importing state and the
owner of the mark in the exporting State [were] the same [economic
entity], or where, even if they [were] separate individuals, they [were]
economically linked . . . [for example], as licensee, parent company,
subsidiary or exclusive distributor.55
Conversely, exhaustion did not apply where trademark rights had been
assigned to an unrelated enterprise, no longer under the control of the assignor
or any related enterprises.56 In the ECJ‟s view, in the absence of express or
implied consent, the necessary grounds to invoke trademark exhaustion could
only be found in commercial “unitary control.”57 It could not be possible to
validly invoke the exhaustion of the exclusive rights of the legitimate
trademark owner in the absence of consent or unitary control.58
F. Analysis
According to the ECJ‟s rulings, the primary purpose of trademark
protection, as interpreted from Article 28 and 30 of the EC Treaty, is to
indicate commercial origin.59 The “Affaire Hag” served as an example of how
to understand the ECJ‟s progression in its appreciation of the fundamental
objectives of intellectual property and how it found a compromise between
the interest of intangible property protection and the dictates of the free
movement of goods. Accordingly, when goods have no common origin but
instead have been manufactured and marketed independently, it is always
possible to invoke trademark rights to prevent the importation of products
bearing identical or similar trademarks that might create consumer confusion.
Thus, for national laws to be limited by Article 28 there must typically be a
consensual act by the exporting Member State to cause an exhaustion of rights
in the importing Member State, and thus free parallel imports.60
While affirming the legitimacy of parallel importation of genuine goods
within the European internal market, the ECJ did not exclude the possibility
for trademark owners to invoke exclusive rights where the products at issue

54. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Tritton, supra note 29, at 423.
55. IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. at I-2789 to 792.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 1997 E.C.R. I-6191; Case C-39/97, Canon
Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 1999 R.P.C. 117.
60. CORNISH, supra note 3, at 650.
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were “materially different.”61 In this respect, repackaging and relabeling with
different marks raised interesting issues.62 In many Member States, to sell or
distribute trademarked goods that have been re-packed, re-marked, or
otherwise interfered with was, and still is, considered trademark infringement
because the marks no longer accurately indicate that the goods came unaltered
from the originating enterprise. After the adoption of the Trademark
Directive, while acknowledging that the matter poses a peculiarly provocative
constraint on the free movement of goods, the ECJ held that repackaging and
relabeling are two of the “legitimate reasons” trademark owners may invoke
to prevent parallel trade within the EEA.63 According to the ECJ, to trade
non-genuine or repackaged products constitutes trademark infringement when
it may lead to confusion on the part of the public or provoke unfair detriment
to the trademark itself.64
61. See Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R.1139, 1164-65. Regarding the differences between
“genuine” and “non-genuine goods,” see also MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:51.2, and the legal
literature and case law cited.
62. The ECJ did not make a clear distinction between the packaging and the product, since
“product requirement” also incorporates rules as to the packaging of the product. See Joined Cases
C-267 & C-268/91, France v. Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097, I-6131. With respect to
pharmaceutical products, the ECJ confirmed its approach in Joined Cases C-427, C-429 & C-436/93,
Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S, 1996 E.C.R. I-3457, I-3536 to 3545, and most recently, in
Case C-379/97, Pharmacia & Upjohn SA v. Paranova A/S, 1999 E.C.R. I-6927. See generally Karen
Dyekjaer Hansen & Christian Karhula Lauridsen, Rebranding of Parallel Imported Pharmaceuticals:
The Pharmacia & Upjohn Case, TRADEMARK WORLD, Dec. 1999/Jan. 2000, at 16; David Rosemberg
& Marleen Van Kerckhove, Upjon v. Paranova: Utterly Exhausted by a Trip too Far, 1999 E.I.P.R.
223. On the “relationship between the specific subject-matter of a trademark and the necessity of
repackaging,” see also the April 23, 2002 decisions of the ECJ in Joined Case C-443/99, Merck,
Sharp & Dohme GmbH v. Paranova Pharmazeutika Handels GmbH and Case C-143/00, Boehringer
Ingelheim
Pharma
KG
v.
Swingward
Ltd.,
and
others,
available
at
http://curia.eu.int/en/jurisp/index.htm (last visited May 20, 2002).
63. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 137-139; see generally Ansgar Ohly, Trade
Marks and Parallel Importation – Recent Developments in European Law, 30 I.I.C. 512 (1999); Paul
Torremans, New Repackaging Under the Trade Mark Directive of Well-Established Exhaustion
Principles, 11 E.I.P.R. 664 (1997).
64. For a case concerning these aspects, see Case C-349/95, Loendersloot v. Ballantine & Son
Ltd., 1997 E.C.R. I-6227 and Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV, 1997 E.C.R.
I-6013. For comments, see generally Gert-Jan Van De Kamp, Protection of Trade Marks: The New
Regime – Beyond Origin?, 1998 E.I.P.R. 364; Helen Norman, Perfume, Whisky and Leaping Cats of
Prey: A U.K. Perspective on Three Recent Trade Mark Cases Before the European Court of Justice,
1998 E.I.P.R. 306 (1998); Paul Walsh et al., Parallel Imports: Labelling and Advertising
Trademarked Products, TRADEMARK WORLD, Feb. 1998, at 20. In Frits Loendersloot the Court
affirmed that
Article 36 of the EC Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that the owner of trademark
rights may, even if that constitutes a barrier to intra-Community trade, rely on those rights
to prevent a third party from removing and then re-affixing or replacing labels bearing the
mark which the owner has himself affixed to products he has put on the Community
market, unless: . . . it is established that the use of the trademark rights by the owner to
oppose the marketing of the relabeled products under that trademark would contribute to
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III. DEBATE ON ARTICLE 7(1) OF THE EUROPEAN TRADEMARK DIRECTIVE: IS
COMMUNITY-WIDE EXHAUSTION A MINIMUM STANDARD OR THE GENERAL
CRITERION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY?
Article 7(1) of the European Trademark Directive has been a controversial
provision ever since it was in the drafting process. The text was substantially
altered during the drafting process.65 The final text of the provision codifies
the exhaustion doctrine as established by historical ECJ and confirms the
principle of Community-wide exhaustion for all Member States (EEA-wide
exhaustion since the EEA Agreement entered into force in 1994).66 Article
7(1) states that “the trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its
use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community
under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.”67 However,
according to Article 7(2), this principle does not apply where “there exist
legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of
the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired
after they have been put on the market.”68 The legitimate owner could not be
expected to tolerate “further commercialization” of the branded products
when it affects the essential function of the mark by taking unfair advantage
or causing illegitimate detriment to the trademark‟s reputation.69
While Article 7(1) is rather clear about exhaustion at the Community
level, the provision is not clear about international exhaustion.70 After the
introduction of the Trademark Directive, the question remains whether the
principle of international exhaustion can be preserved in the trademark law of

artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States; . . . it is shown that the
relabelling cannot affect the original condition of the product; . . . the presentation of the
relabeled product is not such as to be liable to damage the reputation of the trademark and
its owner; and . . . the person who relabels the products informs the trademark owner of the
relabelling before the relabeled products are put on sale.
Id. at ¶ 52.
For critical comments on the dangers of extending trademark protection against infringements that do
not contain elements of confusion, see Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 139-140.
65. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 124.
66. See supra note 10.
67. Council Directive 89/104, art. 7(1), 1989 O.J. (L 040) 3.
68. Id. at art. 7(2).
69. In Bristol-Myers Squibb, 1996 E.C.R. at I-3457, Frits Loendersloot, 1997 E.C.R. at I6227, and Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. at I-6013, the Court introduced new elements into the
doctrine of exhaustion, making room for the protection of reputation and goodwill as an exception to
the exhaustion rule even where its essential function, i.e., indicator of origin, is not endangered. See
also Van De Kamp, supra note 64, at 369.
70. Council Directive 89/104, art. 7(1), 1989 O.J. (L 040) 3.
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the Member States that originally recognized this principle, such as Germany,
Austria, England, and the Netherlands.71
There is no doubt that the exhaustion provision of the Trademark
Directive and the CTM Regulation in the Commission‟s original proposal was
intended to apply to those imports from outside the Community as much as to
those within.72 The original text of the 8th recital of the Trademark Directive
stated that “it is not, in principle, possible to prohibit its use by a third party in
71. Nicholas Shea, Does the First Trade Mark Directive Allow International Exhaustion of
Rights?, 10 E.I.P.R. 463, 463 (1995). The German delegation, for example, argued that, even after
the adoption of the Trademark Directive, the national principle of international exhaustion could be
maintained and would not be affected by Article 7(1) of the Directive. This position was strongly
supported by many German authors, in particular by Professor F. K. Beier, the director of the MaxPlanck Institute in Munich. See Beier, supra note 8, at 156-160. In Gefärbte Jeans, 1996 G.R.U.R.
271 (December 14, 1995) (I ZR 210/93), the German Federal Court held, however, that international
exhaustion no longer applied in German trademark law. For a critical analysis of this case, see
Florian Albert & Christopher Heath, Dyed But Not Exhausted – Parallel Imports and Trade Marks in
Germany, 28 I.I.C. 24 (1997). The argument that Article 7(1) only represents a minimum standard
was strongly supported also by the Swedish Government in its argument in Silhouette. 1998
E.T.M.R. 539, ¶¶ 21 and 28-29. Arguing that the Directive was adopted on the basis of Article 95
(ex. Article 100A) of the EC Treaty, the Swedish Government argued, according to Advocate
General Jacobs in his opinion, that “it is not part of the function of a trade mark to enable the owner
to divide up the market and to exploit price differentials. The adoption of international exhaustion
would bring substantial advantages to consumers, and would promote price competition.” Id. at
opinion ¶ 48. According to Article 95:
4. If, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation measure,
a Member State deems it necessary to maintain national provisions on grounds of major
needs referred to in Article 30, or relating to the protection of the environment or the
working environment, it shall notify the Commission of these provisions as well as the
grounds for maintaining them.
5. Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the adoption by the Council or by
the Commission of a harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it necessary to
introduce national provisions based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of
the environment or the working environment on grounds of a problem specific to that
Member State arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify the
Commission of the envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them.
EC TREATY, art. 95.
72. Cornish, supra note 22, at 174; COM(80)635 final/2 at 1. For further analysis on the
preparatory works of the Trademark Directive and the CTM Regulation, see Cornish, supra note 22,
at 173-74. On the nature and extent of Article 7, Cornish asserted that the provision is characterized
as “by nature of derogation . . . in its original context—free from movement within the market under
Article 30 and 36—the provision has indeed only been necessary so far as national trade mark law
would otherwise impose a barrier to that movement.” Id. at 175. The same has been asserted by
Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in Silhouette:
Article 7(1) is a derogation from the rights conferred on the trade-mark owner by Article
5(1). In general derogations should not be construed broadly. Here Article 7(1) cannot be
construed more broadly than as providing for Community exhaustion. It would be
necessary to read into the Directive a further, implied derogation leaving open the
possibility of provision for international exhaustion, which seems contrary to the structure
of the Directive.
Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion ¶ 34.
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respect of goods marketed . . . within or outside the [European] Community
under the trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent . . . .”73 Because of
the “intense pressure from [the Community] and international industry, the
draft . . . was changed . . . confining [it] to goods first marketed with consent
„in the Community.‟”74 While the 8th recital was first amended to take into
account that the Commission‟s decision to not require Member States to
introduce the principle of international exhaustion into their national laws, the
European Council (the “Council”) completely changed its previous text in the
final version of the Trademark Directive.75 The reason given was that “an
approach based solely on principles of trademark law would lead to
undesirable commercial consequences. In so far as third countries do not
acknowledge the principle of international exhaustion, the Commission
proposal would result in discrimination of the industry in the Community.”76
Based on these considerations, it seemed difficult to contend that the
Trademark Directive did not introduce the principle of Community-wide
exhaustion for all Member States, while leaving room for conflicting or
supplementary national rules.77 Arguing that the Trademark Directive
expressly promotes only the partial harmonization of national law,78 those
who favor international exhaustion noted that by restricting the ambit of
Article 7 to EEA-wide exhaustion, the Council did not intend to harmonize
international exhaustion, but rather intended to leave the Member States free
to make or retain their own provisions.79 They contended that, prior to
73. See Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 176 (quoting COM(80)635 final/2 at 1).
74. Cornish, supra note 22, at 174.
75. Id at 176.
76. Document 1-611/83, 1 August 1983, at 63. See also the Commentary to the amended
proposal published by the Commission in 1985 (COM(85) final at 13) where it was affirmed that “in
line with the proposal made by the Economic and Social Committee and Parliament, the Commission
decided not to introduce international exhaustion.”
77. In Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. I-6013, the ECJ stated that Article 7 of the Directive must
be “interpreted in the light of the rules of the [EC] Treaty [about] the free movement of goods, and in
particular Article 36.” Id. at ¶ 37. It also emphasized that the “provision is intended to reconcile
the . . . protection of [trademarks] with the . . . free movement of goods within the [internal] market.”
Id. at ¶ 42.
78. The 3rd recital of the Trademark Directive states that “it does not appear to be necessary at
present to undertake full-scale approximation of the trademark laws of the Member States and it will
be sufficient if approximation is limited to those national provisions of law which most directly affect
the functioning of the internal market.” Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 40/1) For a
discussion concerning the extent of harmonization of the Trademark Directive, see also Advocate
General Jacobs Opinion in Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. 539, ¶¶ 4-7.
79. Shea, supra note 71, at 463. Among those who favor international exhaustion, see
Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 176-78; Beier, supra note 8, at 156-60. According to these authors, the
intention of Article 7 was to codify the court‟s existing case law. They argued that the ECJ had
stressed that the provision should to be interpreted in the same way as the court‟s case law on Article
28 and 30 of the EC Treaty. However, in the leading case, Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin
Record Shops Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 329, the ECJ held that Articles 14(2) and 23 of the Free Agreement
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implementation of the Trademark Directive, Member States had discretion
whether “to adopt the principle of international exhaustion [and,] in absence
of express [direction] to the contrary, [whether this] should remain the
position under the [Trademark] Directive.”80 They also contended that on the
signing of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tarriffs and
Trade, the ECJ had confirmed its opinion81 that Member States retained
competence, “in conjunction with the Community in matters of international
intellectual property.”82 Accordingly, Member States could be considered
“free to negotiate or maintain arrangements with other countries that allow
mutual exhaustion of trade mark rights.”83 Similarly, Article 6 of the TRIPS
Agreement had left open the possibility that any of the signatory countries
could unilaterally adopt international exhaustion.84
The opponents of international exhaustion heavily refuted these
arguments. They relied on the text of the 3rd recital of the Trademark
Directive and asserted that even though the Trademark Directive was not
about total harmonization, international exhaustion was one of the provisions
that the Trademark Directive sought to harmonize because it “most directly
affect[ed] the functioning of the internal market.”85 They argued that
diverging national provisions on international exhaustion would necessarily
result in a lack of harmonization in one of the most important aspects of
trademark rights.86 Allowing international exhaustion at a national level
would produce distortion in the smooth running of intra-EEA trade and would
provide unwelcome barriers to the free movement of goods imported from

of 1972 between the EEC and Portugal (not yet a Member State), which were literal reproductions of
Article 30 of the EC Treaty, did not introduce the principle of exhaustion between Portugal and the
Community.
80. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. 539, ¶ 37.
81. Opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994, 1994 E.C.R. I-5267.
82. Shea, supra note 71, at 464 n.15. (“Thus requiring each Member State individually to
ratify the TRIPS Agreement.”).
83. Id. at 464.
84. See Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 508 (noting that Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement
provides that “for the purposes of dispute settlement [under this Agreement, subject to the provisions
of Articles 3 [“national treatment”] and 4 [“most favoured nation treatment”]] nothing in [this
Agreement] shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights”). This
provision represents a compromise between two opposite approaches: “[t]he US Proposal [to
introduce its own national system,] national exhaustion[,] and the [pleas of] developing countries . . .
for the opposite,” international exhaustion. Id. at 508. Because of the lack of consensus on the issue,
“[e]very country [remained] free to adopt the exhaustion [regime it] want[ed].” Id. On the drafting
of Article 6 of TRIPS, see id. at 506-508. For a critical analysis, see generally Soltysinsky, supra
note 15, at 317-20.
85. Shea, supra note 71, at 484. See also Annette Kur, Harmonization of the Trademarks
Laws in Europe – An Overview, 28 I.I.C. 16 (1997).
86. Shea, supra note 71, at 484. See generally Kur, supra note 85.
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third countries within the EEA.87 Indeed, it would obviously contradict the
spirit of the Trademark Directive and the trend established by the ECJ in its
decisions concerning Articles 28 and 30 of the EC Treaty if international
exhaustion were to only apply within the borders of States that recognize this
principle.88 On the contrary, if products put into the market of the Member
States that allow international exhaustion could freely circulate throughout the
EEA, international exhaustion would be imposed in the whole Community,
and non-exhaustion rules of other countries would be defeated.89
The opponents of international exhaustion found an additional argument
in support of their position in the interpretation of Article 13 of the CTM
Regulation.90 Like Article 7 of the Trademark Directive, the final version of
Article 13 of the CTM Regulation refers exclusively to the exhaustion of
trademark rights in relation to goods marketed within the Community.91
However, the CTM Regulation was different from the Trademark Directive
because it did not intend to achieve partial harmonization.92 The CTM
Regulation affected all Member States and denied any discretion to opt for
alternative rules, including the international exhaustion regime.93
Therefore, the question remained whether the provisions of the CTM
Regulation and the Trademark Directive could be construed differently, even
though they had a common origin and identical text. The opponents of
international exhaustion stressed that, in order to establish a consistent
exhaustion regime applicable to all trademarks within the European market,
the provision of Article 13 of the CTM Regulation supported the view that the
Trademark Directive was intended to preclude international exhaustion.94 In
contrast, the supporters of the principle of international exhaustion argued that
the objectives of the two instruments were different because the Trademark
Directive only aimed for limited harmonization.95

87. Id.; Cornish, supra note 22, at 175.
88. Cornish, supra note 22, at 175; see also Shea, supra note 71, at 464.
89. Cornish, supra note 22, at 175; see also Shea, supra note 71, at 464.
90. Council Regulation EC/40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, art.
13, 1994 O.J. (L 011) [hereinafter CTM Regulation].
91. Article 13(1) of the CTM Regulation states that “[a] Community trade mark shall not
entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the
Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.”Id.
92. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion ¶¶ 59-61.
93. CTM Regulation, supra note 90 ¶ 61. The purpose of the CTM Regulation is to create a
unitary right enforceable throughout the whole Community. Id. ¶ 56. Accordingly, Article 14(1) of
the CTM Regulation requires the effects of the right to be governed solely by its own provisions,
stating that “the effects of Community trademarks shall be governed solely by the provisions of this
Regulation.” Id., art. 14. See also Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion ¶¶ 55-63.
94. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion ¶¶ 61-62.
95. See Shea, supra note 71, at 464.
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Despite the fact that supporters of international exhaustion are not
unfounded in their arguments, the conclusion that Article 7(1) precludes
Member States from adopting international exhaustion, so that any national
provisions in this sense are contrary to European trademark law, seems
difficult to avoid.96 The wording and the purpose of the Trademark Directive,
its legislative history, the identical wording of the CTM Regulation, and the
undesirable effects of leaving matters to the discretion of the Member States
favor such a position. On the other hand, differences in the interpretation of
the issue at the national level represent a barrier to consistent enforcement
practices throughout the Community.97
Several national courts have
repeatedly tried to force an interpretation of the Trademark Directive towards
the direct or indirect acceptance of international exhaustion. So far, the
adoption of the Trademark Directive does not appear to have profoundly
changed the way many national courts evaluate the issue, which is necessary
in order to ensure a consistent Community harmonization.98 It has been
noticed that “there is still scope for national courts . . . to reach different views
on the same issue when applying [Community] intellectual property law.”99
IV. VIEW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITY-WIDE
EXHAUSTION AS CONFIRMED IN SILHOUETTE AND SEBAGO
In light of the previous discussion, it is not surprising that in the last few
years, national tribunals have repeatedly referred to the decisions of the ECJ
for guidance when interpreting Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive.100
Because divergences in domestic laws predate the Trademark Directive, it is
not surprising that the question of compatibility of international trademark
exhaustion with Community law is always raised in those countries that adopt
international exhaustion.101
The ECJ‟s rulings represent the most highly qualified guidelines on the
interpretation of Community Law. However, from a legal standpoint, they are
not binding upon national courts. As for now, domestic tribunals have shown
a general willingness to follow the ECJ‟s decisions. Because the ECJ‟s
rulings do not technically represent the “law of Europe,” national decisions

96. See Joller, supra note 1, at 309; George Pucher, Der zeitliche Anwendungsbereich der nur
EWR-weiten Erschöpfung im Markenrecht, 4 W.R.P. 362 (1998).
97. See Shea, supra note 71, at 464; Cornish, supra note 22, at 173-75.
98. For a summary of the different practices and attitudes in the interpretation of the issue by
national courts and legislators, see Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 502-506. Very interesting in this
respect is the study carried out by Abbe E. L. Brown, Post-Harmonisation Europe—United, Divided
or Unimportant? 2001 INTELL. PROP. Q. 275.
99. Brown, supra note 98, at 279.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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cannot be excluded in the future, even after the conclusions reached by the
ECJ in the following cases.
A. Silhouette
The need for interpretation of Article 7(1) was first expressed by the
Austrian Supreme Court when it was confronted with the re-importation from
Bulgaria to Austria of sunglasses and spectacle frames bearing the trademark
“Silhouette.”102 The Austrian company, Silhouette International Schmied
(Silhouette International), sold 21,000 out-of-fashion sunglasses and spectacle
frames to a Bulgarian company at a discount price with the instruction to sell
those products only in Bulgaria or the states of the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and not to export them to other countries.103
“Nevertheless, the goods found their way back to Austria where the discount
chain Hartlauer tried to sell them at . . . advantageous price[s].”104 Silhouette
International argued that the products at issue had been put into the market in
the EEA without its consent and therefore brought an action for interim relief
against Hartlauer.105 Silhouette International claimed that its trademark right
was not exhausted, since that would only occur when its products were put
into the EEA market.106
Prior to the implementation of the Trademark Directive, Austrian courts
applied the principle of international exhaustion.107 However, the position
subsequent to implementation was still unclear.108
The explanatory
memorandum to the Austrian law that implemented Article 7 of the
Trademark Directive indicated that the law was intended to leave the question
of whether the principle of international exhaustion was valid to future
judicial decisions.109 The Austrian Supreme Court decided to ask the ECJ
whether national rules providing for exhaustion of trademark rights with
respect to products put into the market outside the EEA by the trademark
owner or with his consent are contrary to Article 7(1) of the Trademark
Directive.110 In other words, the question to resolve was whether the principle

102. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. ¶¶ 1-14.
103. Id. ¶ 8.
104. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 125.
105. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. ¶ 10.
106. Id. The judicial proceedings at the national level are summarized in the ECJ‟s decision.
Id. ¶¶ 10-14.
107. Id. ¶ 13.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 504.
110. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. ¶ 15.
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of international exhaustion was still applicable under Austrian law after the
implementation of the Trademark Directive.111
The answer given by the ECJ followed the approach adopted by the
Commission and the Council when they issued the Trademark Directive.112
On July 16, 1998, the ECJ clarified that “national rules providing for
exhaustion of trademark rights in respect of products put on the market
outside the EEA under that mark by the proprietor or with his consent are
contrary to Article 7(1) of the Directive.”113 While confirming the principle
of EEA-wide exhaustion, the Advocate General emphasized that
“international exhaustion is one of the . . . [matters] which „most directly
affect the functioning of the internal market‟ and . . . which the [Trademark]
Directive . . . [seeks] to harmonize.”114 Accordingly, “if some Member States
practice international exhaustion while others do not, there will be trade
barriers within the internal market which it is precisely the object of the
[Trademark] Directive to remove.”115 In particular, the Advocate General
stressed that “the [Trademark] Directive cannot be interpreted as leaving it
open to the Member States to provide in their domestic law for exhaustion of
the rights conferred by a trade mark in respect of products put on the market
111. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 125. The questions asked by the Austrian
Supreme Court were:
(1) Is Article 7(1) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trademarks (OJ 1989 L 40, p.1) to
be interpreted as meaning that the trademark entitles its proprietor to prohibit a third party
from using the mark for goods which have been put on the market under that mark in a
State which is not a Contracting State?
(2) May the proprietor of the trademark on the basis of Article 7(1) of the Trade Marks
Directive alone seek an order that the third party cease using the trademark for goods
which have been put on the market under that mark in a State which is not a Contracting
State?
Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. ¶ 14.
112. See id. ¶ 27. For discussions of this case, see generally Alan W. White, Sunglasses: A
Benefit to Health? 1999 E.I.P.R. 176; Jochen Pagenberg, The Exhaustion Principle and ―Silhouette‖
Case, 30 I.I.C. 19 (1999); Andrew Clark, Parallel Imports: A New Job for Customs?, 1999 E.I.P.R.
1; Thomas Hays, The Silhouette Case: The European Union Moves to the Highest Common
Denominator on the Gray Market Question, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 234 (1998); Thomas Hays & Peter
Hansen, Silhouette is not the Proper Case Upon Which to Decide the Parallel Importation Question,
1998 E.I.P.R. 277; Carl Steele, ―Fortress Europe‖ for Trademark Owners: The Spectacle of the ECJ
Silhouette Judgment, TRADEMARK WORLD Aug. 1998, at 14.
113. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. ¶ 31. In its ruling, the court affirmed:
National rules providing for exhaustion of trade-mark rights in respect of products put on
the market outside the EEA under that mark by the proprietor or with its consent are
contrary to Article 7(1) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of December 21, 1988 to
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trademarks, as amended by the
Agreement on the European Economic Area of May 2, 1992.
Id. at Ruling ¶ 1.
114. Id. at Opinion ¶ 41.
115. Id.
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in non-member countries.”116 The ECJ replied to the argument of the Swedish
Government that the [Trademark] Directive was adopted on the basis of
Article 100(a) of the Treaty “with the result that Article 7 is to be interpreted
as meaning that the [Trademark] Directive applies only to intra-Community
relations.”117 The ECJ stated that “Article 7 is not intended to regulate
relations between Member States and non-member countries but to define the
rights of proprietors of trademarks in the Community.”118 In the ECJ‟s view,
“[t]his is the only interpretation which is fully capable of ensuring that the
purpose of the [Trademark] Directive is achieved, namely to safeguard the
functioning of the internal market.”119
Considering the strong pressure from some Member States, the ECJ
ultimately noted that “the Community authorities could always extend the
exhaustion provided for by Article 7 to products put on the market in nonmember countries by entering into international agreements in that sphere, as
was done in the context of the EEA Agreement.”120 However, as noted
earlier, this approach could come under the scope of the WTO Agreement.121
Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement does not address exhaustion.122 Despite
this, establishing bilateral or multilateral agreements with non-member
countries for the purpose of trademark exhaustion may ultimately represent a
violation of the principle of “Most Favored Nation” as per Article 4 of
TRIPS.123
B. Silhouette & Mag Instrument
In its judgment, the ECJ attempted to overrule a decision adopted by the
EFTA Court of Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, on the same issue one

116. Id. at Opinion ¶ 26.
117. Id. ¶ 28. For the full text of Article 95 (ex. Article 100A) of the EC Treaty, see supra
note 71.
118. Id. ¶ 29.
119. Id. ¶ 27. Following the ECJ decision, the Austrian Supreme Court decided the Silhouette
case consistently with the ECJ, and declared that Silhouette Internationale‟s rights “were not
exhausted by putting its spectacles bearing the trademark on the market in Bulgaria; by re-importing
these spectacles into Austria, the defendant has infringed Sec. 10a(1) of the Trademark Act.” Id. See
also Case No. 4 Ob 223/98, Decision of the Austrian Supreme Court, 31 I.I.C. 207, 212 (2000).
120. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. ¶ 30.
121. See Verma, supra note 4, at 552-62; Heath, supra note 1, at 628-30; Soltysinsky, supra
note 15, at 316.
122. Verma, supra note 4, at 535.
123. See Shea, supra note 71, at 464 n.16; Verma, supra note 4, at 552-62. “A review of
TRIPS started in 2000 and it was believed that one issue which may be considered was the question
of parallel import[ation] and [trademark] exhaustion.” Brown, supra note 98, at 285. However, “[t]o
date . . . there [are no new] developments in this regard.” Id. The issue was not stressed, as it was not
even on the agenda, during the WTO Conference in Doha, Quatar, in November 2001. For further
details see the WTO web site at http://www.wto.org (last visited May 2, 2002).
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year earlier in Mag Instrument Inc. v. California Trading Company.124 Mag
Instrument concerned the parallel importation of flashlights from the United
States into Norway.125 The EFTA Court argued that “the principle of
international exhaustion is in the interest of free trade and competition, and
thus in the interest of consumers.”126 The court stated that it was for the
courts or legislators in EFTA States to decide whether they wish to introduce
or maintain the principle of international exhaustion of trademark rights for
products imported from outside the EEA.127 In order to draw a distinction
between the position of the EFTA countries and the Member States, the court
stressed that, “unlike the EC Treaty, the EEA Agreement does not establish a
customs union,”128 but merely a free trade area, and that the EEA Agreement
does not entail a common commercial policy towards third countries.129
This decision encountered severe criticism. Even if there is no doubt that
international exhaustion can play an important role in increasing competition,
the approach suggested by the EFTA Court would result in reinstating those
barriers against the free movement of goods within the EEA that the

124. 29 I.I.C. 316 (EFTA 1998).
125. Id.
126. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 505.
127. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion ¶ 30.
128. Id. at Opinion ¶ 43.
129. See id; see also Mag Instrument, 29 I.I.C. at 316. According to the EFTA Court, the
principle of Community-wide exhaustion only applies to products “originating in the EEA . . . .” Id.
at ¶ 43. Indeed,
[t]he purpose and the scope of the EC Treaty and the EEA Agreement are different (see
Opinion 1/91 of the ECJ regarding the Draft Agreement between the Community, on the
one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating
to the creation of the European Economic Area [1991] ECR I-6079). Thus, the EEA
Agreement does not establish a customs union, but a free trade area. The above mentioned
differences between the Community and the EEA will have to be reflected in the
application of the principle of exhaustion of trademark rights. According to Article 8 EEA,
the principle of free movement of goods as laid down in Articles 11 to 13 EEA applies only
to goods originating in the EEA, while in the Community a product is in free circulation
once it has been lawfully placed on the market in a Member State. In general, the latter
applies in the context of the EEA only in respect of products originating in the EEA. In the
case at hand, the product was manufactured in the United States and imported into Norway.
Accordingly, it is not subject to the principle of the free movement of goods within the
EEA.
Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion ¶ 43 (quoting Mag Instrument, 29 I.I.C. ¶¶ 25-26). For an
interesting comparison of the two decisions, Silhouette and Mag Instruments, see Anna Carboni,
Cases About Spectacles and Torches: Now, Can We See the Light? 1998 E.I.P.R. 470; Joller, supra
note 1, at 751-65; Kunz-Hallstein, Zur Frage der Parallelimporte im Internationalen Gewerblichen
Rechtsschutz, 1998 G.R.U.R. 268; Troller, The Parallel Importation of Trade-Marked Goods and the
Protection of Selective Distribution Systems, 1998 E.I.P.R. 67. Always interesting in this respect is
Vanderburg, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods is not a Trademark Problem,
1959 TRADEMARK REP. 707 (1959).
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Trademark Directive attempts to eliminate by harmonizing national laws.130
Within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the EC Treaty, the exclusive rights of
trademark owners are equally exhausted if products are put into the market in
Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, or in any Member State of the
Community. Consistency between the ECJ and the EFTA Court is necessary
in order to avoid conflicting interpretations.131
C. Sebago
One year after Silhouette, the ECJ confirmed the principle of EEA-wide
exhaustion in Sebago.132 Sebago, a United States corporation, and Maison
Dubois, Sebago‟s exclusive distributor in the Benelux, contended that another
company‟s importation into Belgium of shoes marketed in El Salvador,
bearing Sebago‟s trademark “Docksides,” without their consent, constituted
trademark infringement under Benelux Trademark Law.133 The trademark
owners argued that their rights had not been exhausted under Article 13A(8)
of the Benelux Uniform Trademark Law, which had implemented Article 7 of
the Trademark Directive, because the products in question were put into the
market outside the EEA and were brought into Belgium without their
consent.134 In response, GB-Unic, the company that imported the shoes,
argued that “to satisfy the consent requirement in Article 13A(8) of
the . . . [Benelux Trademark Law, it was sufficient] that similar goods bearing
the same trade mark had already been lawfully marketed in the Community
with the consent of the trade mark proprietor.”135 In turn, Sebago claimed that
“consent must be obtained for each defined batch of goods.”136 GB-Unic also
argued that Sebago had given implied consent to the importation of the
Docksides shoes into the EEA by failing to impose an export ban on its
licensee in El Salvador.137 Accordingly, this failure should be interpreted as
implied consent to importation of the products at issue into the EEA.138
The Brussels Court of Appeal dismissed the latter argument because GBUnic could not prove that Sebago had effectively granted a license to use the

130. See Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 505-506.
131. See id. Contrary to what is stated by the EFTA Court, it was also not so clear whether
the EEA countries could withdraw so easily from the EC intellectual property rules.
132. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. ¶ 22.
133. Id. ¶¶ 5-8.
134. Id.
135. Id. ¶ 10.
136. Id.
137. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. ¶ 11.
138. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 126 (summarizing the ECJ‟s decision); see
also Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. ¶¶ 1-11 (stating the opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs).
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trademark in El Salvador.139 As this Study will analyze, the same argument
was subsequently raised in the High Court cases Zino Davidoff and Levi
Strauss140 in England. Instead, the Brussels Court of Appeal deferred to the
ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the general extent of Article 7(1) of the
Trademark Directive.141 More specifically, the Belgian Court asked whether
consent could be considered implied within the meaning of Article 7(1) when
the trademark owner had consented to the marketing of other individual
batches of the products in the EEA.142
In its July 1, 1999 decision, the ECJ restated its previous ruling in
Silhouette and affirmed that “the rights conferred by the trademark are
exhausted only if the products have been put on the market in [the EEA].”143
Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive “does not leave it open to the Member
States to provide in their domestic law for exhaustion of the rights conferred
by the trademark in respect of products put on the market in non-member
countries.”144 The ECJ then stated that:
139. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. ¶ 30.
140. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99).
141. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. ¶ 10.
142. Id. ¶ 12. The Brussels Court of Appeal referred to the ECJ the following questions:
Is Article 7(1) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks . . . to be interpreted as
meaning that the right conferred by the trademark entitles its proprietor to oppose the use
of his trademark in relation to genuine goods which have not been put on the market in the
European Economic Community (extended to Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein by virtue
of the Agreement of 2 May 1992 establishing the European Economic Area) by the
proprietor or with his consent, where:
- the goods bearing the trademark come directly from a country outside the Community or
the European Economic Area,
- the goods bearing the trademark come from a Member State of the Community or of the
European Economic Area in which they are in transit without the consent of the proprietor
of the trademark or his representative,
- if the goods were acquired in a Member State of the European Community or of the
European Economic Area in which they were put on sale for the first time without the
consent of the proprietor of the trademark or his representative,
- either where goods bearing the trademark - which are identical to the genuine goods
bearing the same trademark but are imported in parallel either directly or indirectly from
countries outside the European Community or the European Economic Area - are, or have
already been, marketed within the Community or the European Economic Area by the
proprietor of the trademark or with his consent,
- or where goods bearing the trademark - which are similar to the genuine goods bearing
the same trademark but imported in parallel either directly or indirectly from countries
outside the European Community or the European Economic Area - are, or have already
been, marketed within the Community or the European Economic Area by the proprietor of
the trademark or with his consent.
Id. ¶ 10.
143. Id. ¶ 22. The same statement is reaffirmed in the ECJ‟s conclusions.
144. Id.
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protection would be devoid of substance if, for there to be exhaustion
within the meaning of Article 7, it were sufficient for the trade-mark
proprietor to have consented to the putting on the market in that
territory of goods which were identical or similar to those in respect of
which exhaustion is claimed.145
Accordingly, the ECJ thought the answer to the second question addressed
by the Brussels Court of Appeal should be that “for there to be consent within
the meaning of Article 7(1) of the [D]irective, such consent must relate to
each individual item of the product in respect of which exhaustion is
pleaded.”146 In support of its ruling, the ECJ stated that its “interpretation is,
moreover, confirmed by Article 7(2) of the [Trademark] Directive which, in
its reference to the „further commercialization‟ of goods, shows that the
principle of exhaustion concerns only specific goods which have first been put
on the market with the consent of the trade-mark proprietor.”147
The arguments proposed by the defendant GB-Unic in Sebago148 looked
innovative and interesting from a legal standpoint.
However, they
misinterpreted the exhaustion doctrine‟s rationale of preventing abuses of
trademark rights by limiting the control of the proprietor of the trademark to
the first sale of the products bearing his trademark. 149 The principle of
exhaustion, whether EEA-wide or international, should apply to each
individual product and not to types of goods or product lines. As noted by
Advocate General Jacobs in Sebago, if a limitation of trademark rights
through the adoption of the principle of international exhaustion in the EEA
“seem[s] desirable and would no doubt be welcomed in many circles,”150 it
should be decided as a matter of Community law.151 As the Advocate General
stressed:
145. Id. ¶ 21.
146. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R.. ¶ 22. The ECJ also affirmed that this is the interpretation of Article
7(1) that the Court has already adopted. Thus, the Court has already held that the purpose of that
provision is to make possible the further marketing of an individual item of a product bearing a
trademark that has been put on the market with the consent of the trade-mark proprietor and to
prevent him from opposing such marketing (Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora [1997]
ECR I-6013, paragraphs 37 and 38, and Case C-63/97 BMW v Deenik [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph
57). That interpretation is, moreover, confirmed by Article 7(2) of the Directive which, in its
reference to the „further commercialisation‟ of goods, shows that the principle of exhaustion
concerns only specific goods which have first been put on the market with the consent of the trademark proprietor. Id. ¶ 20.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
150. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. ¶ 29.
151. Id. The Advocate General pointed out that “[h]owever, as the Court observed in
Silhouette, no argument has been presented to the Court that the Directive could be interpreted as
imposing a rule of international exhaustion. The dispute centered only on whether the Directive left
the matter to the discretion of the Member States.” Id.
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[t]he [C]ourt cannot . . . be expected to stand legislation on its head in
order to achieve an objective, even were it to be considered desirable.
If the [Trademark] Directive is found to have effects which are
unacceptable, the correct remedy is to amend the [Trademark]
Directive or, as the court observed in . . . Silhouette, to enter into
international agreements in order to extend the principle of exhaustion
to products put on the market in non-member countries, as was done
in the EEA Agreement.152
Once again, the latter approach may be construed as a violation of Article
4 of the TRIPS Agreement. Accordingly, a general consensus for the
amendment of the Trademark Directive could represent a more adequate
solution to the issue.
V. ZINO DAVIDOFF AND LEVI STRAUSS:
INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION VIA THE BACK DOOR?
In 1999, the High Court of Justice in London reexamined whether or not
consent could be implied under certain conditions, as per Article 7(1) of the
Trademark Directive, in three cases that concerned the parallel importation of
genuine products from outside the EEA: Zino Davidoff v. A & G Imports,153
Levi Strauss v. Tesco Stores,154 and Levi Strauss v. Costco Wholesale.155
These cases did not follow the position adopted by the ECJ in Silhouette and
Sebago, once again showing the reluctance of some Member States to accept
the principle of Community-wide exhaustion in their domestic law.
Nevertheless, these cases introduced very interesting elements into the debate
on the exhaustion of trademark rights. They emphasized the question of the
role of national contract law, and because international contracts were
involved, the role of national rules on private international law in relation to

152. Id. ¶ 30. See generally Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 501. The author stresses how,
during the drafting proceeding of the Trademark Directive, the Commission pointed out that, even if
it had decided to introduce the principle of Community-wide exhaustion,
the Community must, however, be empowered to conclude, at some future time, with
important trading partners, bilateral or multilateral agreements, whereby international
exhaustion is introduced by the contracting parties. The restriction to Community-wide
exhaustion, however, does not prevent the national courts from extending this principle, in
cases of a special nature, in particular where, even in the absence of a formal agreement,
reciprocity is guaranteed.
Commission Explanatory Memorandum, COM(84)470 final.
153. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. at 567. For comments on this case see, Stamatoudi &
Torremans, supra note 22, at 129; Anna Carboni, Zino Davidoff SA v. A&G Imports Limited: A
Way Around Silhouette?, 1999 E.I.P.R. 524; Carl Steele, Silhouette Put in the Shade: A Summary of
the Recent Davidoff Case, 119 TRADEMARK WORLD 25 (1999); Robert Swift, Davidoff: Scottish
Court Declines to Follow English Rule on Parallel Imports, 2000 E.I.P.R. 376.
154. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99).
155. Id.
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choice of law in contractual matters.156 These cases were referred to the ECJ
for a preliminary ruling. Following its previous position, the ECJ reaffirmed
the regime of Community-wide exhaustion as the applicable rule within the
EEA, and consistently analyzed the issue of “consent” as per Article 7(1) of
the Trademark Directive.157
A. Zino Davidoff v. Imports Limited
Zino Davidoff came before Mr. Justice Laddie in the High Court of
London as an application for summary judgment.158 Davidoff SA, the owner
of the trademarks “Cool Water” and “Davidoff Cool Water,” tried to prevent
the importation of a batch of Davidoff toiletries to the EEA by A&G Imports
(A&G).159 The batch in question had been marketed in Singapore with
Davidoff‟s consent.160 Even though it was clear that the products were not
marketed within the Community with the explicit consent of the trademark
owner, it was unclear whether Davidoff‟s consent to the marketing of its
products in Singapore implicitly extended to their free circulation and sale
around the world.161 “Davidoff den[ied] that it had consented, or could be
treated as having consented” to further commercialization of the products in
question.162 In turn, A&G argued that there was consent and that the exact
content and implications of the consent were to be derived from the contract
for the sale of the goods.163 Mr. Justice Laddie felt that, pursuant to the
relevant law of contract in this case, it was arguable that subsequent
purchasers of Davidoff‟s products were free to market the goods within the
EEA and that the plaintiffs were to be treated as having consented to such
marketing.164 It was suggested that English law included a rebuttable
presumption that, in the absence of the imposition of a full and explicit
restriction on purchasers at the time of purchase, trademark owners are to be
treated as having consented to the importation and the sale of the goods in the
EEA.165 In this case, full and explicit restriction had not been imposed.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 129.
Id. at 130.
Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. at 568.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 20.
Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. at ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 28.
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Accordingly, on May 18, 1999, the High Court declined to grant summary
judgment because it did not consider the defendant‟s arguments unfounded.166
Because the case raised fundamental questions relating to the scope and
effect of Article 7 of the Trademark Directive, a reply to which would be
necessary for the determination of the issue at the full trial, the High Court of
London deferred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.167 The High Court asked
whether the concept of consent, as per Article 7(1), could extend to implicit or
indirect consent and not only to explicit and direct consent.168 It also asked
whether a national law, which constitutes a general presumption that
trademark owners have waived their exclusive rights in the absence of a full
and explicit restriction, could be considered consistent within the Trademark
Directive‟s meaning.169

166. Id. ¶ 37 (arguing that “neither Silhouette nor Sebago throw any light on the issue of how
the proprietor can object effectively to such trade”). Justice Laddie further declared:
the rights of the third party can be determined by the law of the contract of supply to that
customer or the law of the non EEA country in which the sale to the third party takes place.
Where that law includes a rebuttable presumption that, in the absence of full or explicit
restrictions being imposed on purchasers at the time of purchase, the proprietor is treated as
consenting to the goods being imported into and sold in the EEA, courts within the EEA
are free to recognize the effect of that law and to allow importation of the authorized
external goods accordingly.
Id. ¶ 39. For further details, see Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99). In
this context it should also be noticed that a very similar case was submitted to the Outer House of the
Court of Session in Scotland (JOOP! GmbH v. M&S Toiletries Ltd and Zino Davidoff SA v. M&S
Toiletries Ltd., reported by Brown, supra note 98, at 279). While the parallel importers argued that,
because of insufficient marketing restrictions, there was implied consent to re-importation into the
EEA, the Scottish court found that the trademark owner had taken all reasonable measures to ensure
goods would be sold in particular territories. Accordingly, no implied consent could be inferred. Id.
167. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. ¶ 43.
168. Id. at ¶¶ 16-25.
169. Id. The High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Chancery Division (Patent Court),
requested the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on the following questions:
(1) Insofar as First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the
laws of the Member States relating to trademarks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1) refers to goods
being put on the market in the Community with the consent of the proprietor of a mark, is it
to be interpreted as including consent given expressly or implicitly and directly or
indirectly?
(2) Where: (a) a proprietor has consented to or allowed goods to be placed in the hands of a
third party in circumstances where the latter‟s rights to further market the goods are
determined by the law of the contract of purchase under which that party acquired the
goods, and (b) the said law allows the vendor to impose restrictions on the further
marketing or use of the goods by the purchaser but also provides that, absent the imposition
by or on behalf of the proprietor of effective restrictions on the purchaser‟s right to further
market the goods, the third party acquires a right to market the goods in any country,
including the Community, then, if restrictions effective according to that law to limit the
third party‟s rights to market the goods have not been imposed, is the Directive to be
interpreted so as to treat the proprietor as having consented to the right of the third party
acquired thereby to market the goods in the Community?
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B. Levi Strauss v. Tesco Stores and Levi Strauss v. Costco Wholesale
The issue of how to interpret “consent” was raised again before Mr.
Justice Pumfrey in the High Court of London in Levi Strauss v. Tesco Stores
and Costco Wholesale.170 Levi Strauss commenced proceedings against Tesco
Stores and Costco Wholesale, claiming trademark infringement of its “Levi‟s”
mark.171 Levi Strauss had refused, directly or through its subsidiary in
England, to sell Levi‟s 501 jeans to Tesco and Costco.172 It had also refused
to allow these companies to operate as authorized distributors of the products
in question.173 Tesco and Costco accordingly obtained genuine top-quality
Levi‟s 501 jeans from traders who had imported such jeans from countries
outside the EEA.174 The jeans sold by Tesco had been manufactured by, or on
behalf of Levi Strauss in the United States, Canada, or Mexico and were first
sold in those respective countries.175 The jeans sold by Costco had also been
manufactured in the United States or Mexico.176 The contracts pursuant to
which Tesco and Costco purchased these jeans contained no restrictions as to
the markets in which the goods could be sold.177

(3) If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, is it for the national courts to
determine whether, in all the circumstances, effective restrictions were imposed on the
third party?
(4) Is Article 7(2) of the Directive to be interpreted in such a way that legitimate reasons
for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of his goods include any actions by a
third party which affect to a substantial extent the value, allure or image of the trademark
or the goods to which it is applied?
(5) Is Article 7(2) of the Directive to be interpreted in such a way that legitimate reasons
for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of his goods include the removal or
obliteration by third parties (in whole or in part) of any markings on the goods where such
removal or obliteration is not likely to cause any serious or substantial damage to the
reputation of the trademark or the goods bearing the mark?
(6) Is Article 7(2) of the Directive to be interpreted in such a way that legitimate reasons
for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of his goods include the removal or
obliteration by third parties (in whole or in part) of batch code numbers on the goods where
such removal or obliteration results in the goods in question (i) offending against any part
of the criminal code of a Member State (other than a part concerned with trademarks) or
(ii) offending against the provisions of Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products (OJ 1976
L 262, p. 169)?
Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶ 16.
170. Id. at Opinion ¶¶ 1-2.
171. Id. ¶ 24.
172. Id. ¶ 21.
173. Id.
174. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶ 22.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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Levi Strauss emphasized its selling policy for the above countries. In the
United States and Canada, Levi Strauss sells its products to authorized
retailers, who are obliged, under pain of having their supplies cut off, to sell
the jeans exclusively to end users.178 In Mexico, Levi Strauss usually sells its
goods to authorized wholesalers under the condition that they will not be
exported from Mexico.179 In response, Tesco and Costco argued that they had
acquired an unrestricted right to dispose of the jeans as they wish, because no
express restriction was expressly imposed by contract.180
It was against this background that in July, 1999, a few months after
Justice Laddie‟s decision in Zino Davidoff, the High Court decided to defer to
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The questions asked by the High Court were
very similar to the ones asked previously in Zino Davidoff.181 The High Court
focused on the need to clarify the concept of consent, and in particular the
concept of implied consent, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Trademark
Directive. The High Court also addressed the compatibility of Community
law with the national provision, according to which, trademark owners should
be considered as having waived their exclusive right worldwide in the absence
of any express reservation in the contract governing the sale of the goods.182
In addition, the High Court raised the question of whether a restriction of the
right to dispose freely of goods may be relied upon against a third party
transferee when it is imposed on the first purchaser by the first vendor, or
agreed between the two parties to the sale.183

178. Id. at ¶ 25.
179. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶ 25.
180. Id. ¶ 27.
181. Id. ¶ 28.
182. Id.
183. Id. The High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Chancery Division (Patent Court),
referred the following questions to the Court of Justice:
(1) Where goods bearing a registered trademark have been placed on the market in a nonEEA country by the trademark proprietor or with his consent and those goods have been
imported into or sold in the EEA by a third party, is the effect of Directive 89/104/EEC
(the Directive) that the trademark proprietor is entitled to prohibit such importation or sale
unless he has expressly and explicitly consented to it, or may such consent be implied?
(2) If the answer to Question 1 is that consent may be implied, is consent to be implied
from the fact that the goods have been sold by the proprietor or on his behalf without
contractual restrictions prohibiting resale within the EEA binding the first and all
subsequent purchasers?
(3) Where goods bearing a registered trademark have been placed on the market in a nonEEA country by the trademark proprietor:
(a) to what extent is it relevant to or determinative of the issue whether or not there was
consent by the proprietor to the placing of those goods on the market within the EEA,
within the meaning of the Directive, that: (i) the person placing the goods on the market
(not being an authorized retailer) does so with the knowledge that he is the lawful owner of
the goods and the goods bear no indication that they may not be placed on the market in the
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C. The ECJ’s Decision
On November 20, 2001, the ECJ issued its decision.184 Clearly aware that
the questions addressed by the High Court of London were characterized by
its criticisms of the exclusion of international exhaustion of trademark rights
pursuant to the Trademark Directive,185 the ECJ again confirmed the principle
of EEA-wide exhaustion as the general rule to be applied within the EEA.186
The ECJ focused its attention on the interpretation of “consent,” and pointed
out that consent, as per Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive, constitutes
the decisive factor to be considered when assessing the extinction of a
trademark owner‟s right to prevent third parties from importing goods bearing
his trademark into the EEA.187 The interpretation of “consent” is a matter of
Community law and should be consistent throughout the EEA.188 Should the
meaning of “consent” be a matter for national laws, divergences in the
threshold of trademark protection may develop and eventually undermine the

EEA; and/or (ii) the person placing the goods on the market (not being an authorized
retailer) does so with knowledge that the trademark proprietor objects to those goods being
placed on the market within the EEA; and/or (iii) the person placing the goods on the
market (not being an authorized retailer) does so with the knowledge that the trademark
proprietor objects to them being placed on the market by anyone other than an authorized
retailer; and/or (iv) the goods have been purchased from authorized retailers in a non-EEA
country who have been informed by the proprietor that the proprietor objects to the sale of
the goods by them for the purposes of resale, but who have not imposed upon purchasers
from them any contractual restrictions on the manner in which the goods may be disposed
of; and/or (v) the goods have been purchased from authorized wholesalers in a non-EEA
country who have been informed by the proprietor that the goods were to be sold to
retailers in that non-EEA country and were not to be sold for export, but who have not
imposed upon purchasers from them any contractual restrictions on the manner in which
the goods may be disposed of; and/or (vi) there has or has not been communication by the
proprietor to all subsequent purchasers of its goods (i.e., those between the first purchaser
from the proprietor and the person placing the goods on the market in the EEA) of its
objection to the sale of the goods for the purposes of resale; and/or (vii) a contractual
restriction has or has not been imposed by the proprietor and made legally binding upon the
first purchaser prohibiting sale for the purposes of resale to anyone other than the ultimate
consumer?
(b) Does the issue of whether or not there was consent by the proprietor to the placing of
those goods on the market within the EEA, within the meaning of the Directive, depend on
some further or other factor or factors and, if so, which?
Id. ¶ 28.
184. See generally Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99).
185. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 506-07.
186. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶¶ 30-34.
187. Id. ¶ 41 (stating that “[i]t therefore appears that consent, which is tantamount to the
proprietor‟s renunciation of his exclusive right under Article 5 of the Directive to prevent all third
parties from importing goods bearing his trademark, constitutes the decisive factor in the extinction
of that right”).
188. Id. ¶¶ 42-43.
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purpose of the Trademark Directive‟s harmonization.189 In the absence of a
legislative definition, the ECJ opted to supply a uniform interpretation.190
As a general rule, the ECJ stated that “[i]n view of its serious effect in
extinguishing the exclusive rights [of trademark owners] . . . consent must be
so expressed that an intention to renounce those rights is unequivocally
demonstrated . . . .”191 “Such intention will normally be gathered from an
express statement of consent.”192 Nevertheless, the ECJ admitted that:
consent may, in some cases, be inferred from facts and circumstances
prior to, simultaneous with or subsequent to the placing of the goods
on the market outside the EEA which, in the view of the national
court, unequivocally demonstrate[s] that the proprietor has renounced
his rights [to oppose placing of the goods on the market within the
EEA].193
However, contrary to the London High Court‟s opinion, the ECJ
concluded that consent cannot be inferred
from the fact that the proprietor of the trademark has not
communicated to all subsequent purchasers of the goods placed on the
market outside the EEA his opposition to marketing within the EEA;
from the fact that the goods carry no warning of a prohibition of their
being placed on the market within the EEA; from the fact that the
trademark proprietor has transferred the ownership of the products
bearing the trademark without imposing any contractual reservations
and that, according to the law governing the contract, the property
right transferred includes, in the absence of such reservations, an
unlimited right of resale or, at the very least, a right to market the
goods subsequently within the EEA.194
Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive should accordingly be interpreted
as precluding national rules, such as the English law at issue in these cases
that constitute a general presumption of waiver or are equivalent to such a
presumption. Indeed, a “rule of national law, which is merely based upon the
silence of the trademark proprietor, does not recogn[ize] implied consent, but

189. Id. See also Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 133; Cornish, supra note 22, at
174-5.
190. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶ 43.
191. Id. ¶ 45.
192. Id. ¶ 46.
193. Id. ¶ 47.
194. Id. ¶ 60. Accordingly, the ECJ did not accept the argument stressed by Justice Laddie:
“There is nothing to support the suggestion that existing case law or Community law creates a
presumption that a proprietor shall be taken to object to unfettered distribution of goods which have
been sold on the open market outside the EEA unless he expressly consents to such further
distribution.” Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. 567, ¶ 37. See also Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at
133.
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rather deems consent to have the effect of limiting the protection afforded to
trademark owners.”195
The ECJ expanded its ruling while replying to the last question addressed
by the High Court of London in the Levi Strauss cases. In order to prevent
further attempts to introduce international exhaustion via the back door, the
ECJ adopted an approach clearly in favor of trademark owners. The ECJ
concluded that
[s]ince . . . consent cannot be inferred from the proprietor‟s silence,
preservation of his exclusive right cannot depend on there being an
express prohibition of marketing within the EEA, which the proprietor
is not obliged to impose, nor, a fortiori, on a repetition of that
prohibition in one or more of the contracts concluded in the
distribution chain.196
Accordingly, “national rules on the enforceability of sales restrictions
against third parties are not, therefore, relevant to the resolution of a dispute
between the proprietor of a trade mark and a subsequent trader in the
distribution chain concerning the preservation or extinction of the rights
conferred by the trade mark.”197 In particular, the ECJ stressed that “it is not
relevant [whether] the importer of goods bearing the trade mark is aware that
the proprietor objects to their being placed on the market in the EEA or sold
there by traders other than authorized retailers.”198 It is equally irrelevant if
authorized “retailers and wholesalers have not imposed on their own
purchasers contractual reservations setting out such opposition, even though
they have been informed of it by the trade mark proprietors.”199
The ECJ did not restate the possibility of adopting a less protective
approach on the issue of consent in the future through the establishment of
bilateral or multi-lateral agreements with non-member countries, as it had

195. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶¶ 58-59. In this
respect, Advocate General Stix-Hackl has affirmed in her Opinion (available on the ECJ‟s web site
http://curia.eu.int) that “it is for the national court . . . to determine whether, when the products
concerned were in fact first placed on the market, the trademark proprietor had waived his exclusive
right to control distribution within the EEA.” Id. ¶ 99. On the other hand, such determination should
happen “in compliance with the [provisions] of Community law and having regard to all the
circumstances of the individual case.” Id. ¶ 123.
196. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶ 64.
197. Id. ¶ 65.
198. Id. ¶ 66.
199. Id. This approach is in contrast with the position adopted by the ECJ, on the same issue,
in Case C-306/96, Javico International and Javico AG v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA, 1998
E.C.R. I-1983. For criticism of these aspects, see Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 13941; Cornish, supra note 22, at 176. As noted before, this article does not elaborate on the antitrust
issue. However, it should be pointed out that the position adopted by the ECJ in its decision can be
in contrast with principles of Article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. See supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
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previously done in Silhouette and Sebago.200 As noticed by the Commission
itself, such silence probably derives from the increasing awareness that these
agreements can be held illegal under the WTO system.201 As a result, this
decision will receive severe criticism because it represents a victory for
trademark owners, not for consumers or the market. Because some Member
States and national courts are reluctant to accept the current exhaustion
regime, there is also little doubt that the debate will be reignited by some
domestic tribunal in the near future.202
VI. POLITICAL DEBATE AND RECENT ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE
INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
After the adoption of the Trademark Directive, European institutions and
trade organizations have also debated the proper interpretation of Article 7(1).
Similar to divergences encountered within national courts, Member States and
interested circles were sharply divided. This became apparent during the
discussion in hearings and meetings among European institutions. Once
again, the supporters of international exhaustion claimed that the Community
exhaustion regime constitutes an important barrier to parallel trade and creates
high prices for consumer goods within the Union. Those advocating
Community exhaustion argued that this system is necessary for the promotion
of European investments in innovation and high-quality goods.203
In 1999, the Commission launched a study on the possible economic
consequences of a change in the EEA-wide exhaustion regime.204 This study,
which was carried out by National Economic Research Associates (NERA) in
London and presented to the Commission in February 1999,205 confirmed that
“[t]he main argument for maintaining the current exhaustion regime . . . is to
200. See generally Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99);
Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 129-33.
201. See Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 8.
202. See generally Brown, supra note 98 (providing an updated overview of European
domestic cases on parallel imports).
203. The arguments stressed during the discussions within European institutions are well
summarized
on
the
Commission‟s
web
site
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/01-157.htm (last visited May 20, 2002).
204. Rhys et al., The Choice of Regime of Exhaustion in the Area of Trademarks, European
Commission (1999), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/tmstudy.htm.
205. Id. This study emphasized the impact that a change in the existing regime could have in
different market sectors. For this purpose, it did not focus only on price differentials, “but also on
product quality, product availability, after-sale services (guarantees), employment, distribution
agreements [and] market segmentation.” Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion,
supra note 15, at 15. As a result, the study emphasized that the impact of a change in the “exhaustion
regime would be minimal in certain sectors like alcoholic drinks and confectionery, whereas it may
have more significant consequences in others such as consumer electronics, domestic appliances and
footwear.” Id.
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protect [Community] competitiveness and innovation.”206 In particular, a
change to international exhaustion would reduce the value of intellectual
property and put European companies at a disadvantage against companies in
countries that do not apply the same regime. Furthermore, such a change
would not necessarily lead to a tangible change in the market because
trademark owners could still control the distribution of their goods by setting
up selective distribution networks and prohibiting sales to unauthorized
dealers. This study also listed a series of arguments favoring a change to
international exhaustion.207
“Besides reducing prices . . . [p]arallel
importation would increase inter-brand competition, by reducing the
possibility for a trade mark holder to exploit his position in that [specific]
brand and to set higher prices in certain markets, and by increasing
competition in the distribution of the product.”208 However, the study‟s
overall conclusion was still in favor of the EEA-wide exhaustion regime.209
The results of the NERA study were discussed by Member States and
interested parties in April 1999 during two meetings organized by the
Commission.210 As expected, the Member States appeared still divided on the
issue. Some delegations expressed strong support for the Community
exhaustion regime, whereas others strongly advocated a change to
international exhaustion.211 In particular, “certain delegations expressed
doubts about the conclusions of the [NERA] study and its presumed negative
effects of international exhaustion.”212 It was mentioned “that the positive
long-term effects of international exhaustion should have received more

206. Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 16. The study
also emphasized that Community-wide exhaustion “provides a higher economic reward to firms that
invest in the quality or style of their products, and that this incentive is necessary in order to maintain
the quality and style of products expected by consumers.” Id.
207. Id. at 16.
208. Id.
209. Rhys et al., supra note 202, at 19.
210. For
a
general
overview,
see
Commission‟s
web
site
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/185.htm (last visited May 20, 2002). These
consultations raised the additional question of whether a change in the trademark exhaustion regime
“could be discussed separately from the questions concerning exhaustion of other intellectual
property rights.” Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 15. As
pointed out by representatives of some Member States, “[p]roducts are in many cases protected not
only by trademarks, but [also] by a multiple set of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) (copyright,
patents, etc.).” Communiqué from Commissioner Bolkestein on the Issue of Exhaustion of Trade
Mark Rights, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/comexhaust.htm
(last visited May 20, 2002) [hereinafter Communiqué]. As reported by the Commission in the
Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 17, it was also held that the
introduction of international exhaustion for trademarks would therefore affect only a limited number
of sectors in a limited way.
211. Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 17-19.
212. Id.
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attention,”213 whereas the opponents of international exhaustion suggested that
“the potential negative impacts on consumers caused by a change of regime
had been played down.”214
Consultations with interested parties also showed divergent positions on
the issue.215 Industry representatives “emphasized the important role of trade
marks and other intellectual property rights as incentives for innovation and
research.”216 They observed that “international exhaustion would weaken the
position of trade mark proprietors and have [negative] implications for their
strategic [behavior], this in turn leading to losses in innovation, production
and employment.”217
In opposition, representatives of foreign associations, associations of
parallel traders, and consumer organizations underlined the benefits that free
trade could eventually provide.218 “[A]n international exhaustion regime
would lower prices, increase product availability and increase consumption in
the Community.”219 The opponents of international exhaustion argued that
the introduction of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce) could give consumers
access to a greater choice of products at lower prices.220 In addition, future
expansion of the Community may also have considerable impact on the
internal market by further lowering consumer prices.221 In this context, it was
emphasized that the exhaustion regime for national trademarks and the
Community trademark should be the same.222 Accordingly, a change to
international exhaustion should apply to both systems.223
In December 1999, the Commission published a working document to be
discussed by the Council.224 This document examined four key exhaustion
related issues: (1) the possible consequences of different regimes for national
trademarks compared to Community trademarks, (2) the distinction between
exhaustion regimes and different intellectual property rights, (3) the
“differentiation of exhaustion regimes for different sectors of industry,” and
(4) “international exhaustion through international agreements.”225

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Id. at 17-19.
Id. at 18.
Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 17.
Communiqué, supra note 208.
Id.
Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 3-4.
See generally id.
Id. at 3.
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In May 2000, the Commission concluded that a change from EEA
exhaustion would not, at least in the short term, lead to a significant fall in
consumer prices. The Commission decided not to submit any proposal to
alter the current system of exhaustion.226 These conclusions were based on
the meetings with Member States and interested parties and on the results
highlighted in the Commission‟s working document. The Commission stated
that “trademark policy has only a marginal effect on parallel trade.”227 This
was in line with the position of trade association representatives and was in
part the result of their well conducted lobbying activity. “[O]ther elements,
like distribution arrangements, transport costs, health and safety legislation,
technical standards and labeling differences may have a greater, and more
direct impact.”228
The Commission then considered that “the exhaustion regime for
trademark would have little effect on the marketplace, given the large
majority of products that are covered by a [plurality] of intellectual property
rights.”229 Community-wide exhaustion had been developed to foster the
integration of the internal market.230 If the Community was to introduce
international exhaustion and its trading partners did not do likewise,
Community companies, including subsidiaries and distributors of nonCommunity companies, would face a competitive disadvantage.231
The debate on the issue was reignited in 2001. On February 15, the
European Community Parliament published a draft report entitled “The
Problem of the Exhaustion of Trademark Rights,” once again advocating the
transition to an international exhaustion regime.232 The rationale behind the
request for a change in the current exhaustion regime continued to be that the
absence of international exhaustion could lead to higher prices within the
Community. The report emphasized that the aim of trademark protection is to
promote brand identity, not to allow trademark owners to rely on the right to
prevent parallel importation by creating price differences and market barriers.
In order to find a compromise with industry representatives, this report
excluded pharmaceuticals from international exhaustion application.233 So

226. Communiqué, supra note 208.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Communiqué, supra note 208. While refusing a change in the current regime, the
Commission did not take into account the arguments added to the debate by the High Court of
London in the Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss cases pending at that time before the ECJ.
232. See supra note 21.
233. Id.
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far, relevant legislative amendments to the current exhaustion regime have
been neither discussed nor adopted by the Parliament.234
In April 2001, the Swedish Presidency organized an informal seminar of
internal market and consumer affairs ministers to reexamine the issue.235
Once again, this meeting showed a profound division among the Member
States.236 The only consensus reached during this seminar was that any
change to the exhaustion regime of trademark rights should be considered
according to its impact on employment, product quality and safety, and retail
prices. Because of the divergent approaches and the lack of consensus
between Member States, trade organizations, and consumer associations, the
question of whether international trademark exhaustion should apply in
Europe is likely to continue to be at the center of discussion for a long time.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is apparently little hope left for those who favor international
exhaustion in the European Union. At least for the time being, the ECJ has
made clear that EEA-wide exhaustion is the only applicable criterion within
the internal market, and national rules providing other exhaustion regimes are
in contrast with Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive. According to the
ECJ, in order to guarantee free movement of goods within the European
market, the same exhaustion regime should apply throughout the EEA.
Interpretation of Article 7 at a national level should not contrast with the spirit
of harmonization that characterizes the Trademark Directive. The ECJ‟s
rulings did not exclude the possibility for changes to the current exhaustion
regime. For the sake of harmonization and the smooth running of the internal
market, any change should occur by a general consensus among Member
States.

234. Id. Because of the lack of consensus, the Parliament has called on the Commission in
order to produce a study that examines (once again!) the legal and economic situation related to
trademark exhaustion within Europe and the most important trading nations. According to the
provisional edition of the Parliament‟s minutes, the Parliament has also called on the Commission to
examine the legal situation with regard to the exhaustion of trademark rights in the most
important trading nations; ascertain the prospects for the conclusion of an international
agreement on harmonized rules on exhaustion of trademark rights under the WTO or
WIPO; . . . examine whether clarification of trademark law in respect of non-commercial
imports of goods purchased by consumers via the Internet was needed; submit to
Parliament, by 31 December 2002, a report on these points, containing detailed proposals.
Id. For a recital of the questions originally proposed by the European parliament members, see
L\Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Written Question E-0363/00 to the Commission, Nov 11, 2000, O.J. (C330 E)
(2000).
235. See supra note 201.
236. Id.
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However, because national approaches to international exhaustion
diverge, future inconsistent case law on the issue should be expected.
Although the intervention of the ECJ clarified the interpretation of Article
7(1) as it has been underlined, its rulings are not technically binding for
national courts. In addition, the ECJ‟s rulings in “Affaire Hag” have shown
that the Court can reverse itself while deciding trademark matters. Even
though its decisions have consistently been followed by domestic tribunals,
this cannot prevent possible inconsistent judgments in the future.
There is little doubt that the building of a “fortress Europe” represents a
strategy. It is a European “defense tower” that repels the aggressive
commercial policies of other countries.237 Ideally, trade should be free and
global. Diplomatic negotiations in the WTO framework and the adoption of
the TRIPS Agreement have proven that such “free and global trade” is still
difficult in actual practice. Because of the lack of consensus on the issue and
the economic differences between developed and developing countries, the
choice of whether or not to apply international trademark exhaustion still
remains a matter for national legislators (Community legislators, in the case of
Europe).
The ECJ and the Commission have shown how the Community is not
totally opposed to international exhaustion. This gradual process could start
on the basis of reciprocity agreements with third countries that guarantee
Member States equal treatment of their exports in the states that are parties to
agreements. However, these agreements may represent a violation of the
“most favored nation” principle as per Article 4 of TRIPS. Because of this
risk, the Community and other interested parties have continued to choose a
protective policy (i.e., EEA-wide exhaustion) rather than adopt a liberal
approach in favor of global trade. As soon as other countries adopt
international exhaustion, the Community will probably abandon its defensive
tower. Nevertheless, considering the strong pressure from international
industries against international exhaustion, such change is not likely to happen
in the near future. Multi-national companies can rely on their trademark
rights world-wide because of several national trademark registrations. There
is little doubt that they will try to prevent, by any means, the adoption of
international exhaustion in Europe as well as in any other countries where
they conduct their business.
On the other hand, the adoption of international trademark exhaustion
world-wide will not necessarily result in the creation of the regime with
completely free and global trade that is so feared by trademark owners.
Trademark owners will be able to prevent parallel importations of their
products by placing reservations and restrictions on their licenses and by
237. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 503.
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placing labels on their product that explicitly prohibit exportation to other
countries. As the ECJ ruled, such restrictions might fall within the scope of
Article 81 of the EC Treaty as a violation of competition law, but only under
exceptional circumstances, such as when there are important price differences
between the foreign market and the Community, a large volume of goods
exported to that market, and when trademark owners have an oligopolistic
position on the European market in the relevant goods. Even in a regime of
EEA-wide exhaustion, trademark owners may possibly rely on their exclusive
rights to prevent parallel importation of genuine products under these
circumstances. This should be seen as an abuse of trademark protection and
in conflict with the safeguards of market competition and consumer welfare.
Finally, while international exhaustion appears to be banned from the
European Union for the time being, there should be concern for the
effectiveness of the EEA-wide exhaustion principle itself. In recent cases
about repackaged and relabeled products, the ECJ held that trademark rights
are not exhausted, “even if that constitutes a barrier to intra-[C]ommunity
trade,” when an unauthorized third party has been removing and then reaffixing or replacing labels bearing the mark that was originally affixed to
products by the trademark owner, unless “the relabeling cannot affect the
original condition of the product; the presentation of the relabeled product is
not such as to be liable to damage the reputation of the trademark and its
owner; and the person who relabels the products informs the trademark owner
of the relabeling before the relabeled products are put on sale.”238
Considering the traditional antagonism of trademark owners towards the
principle of trademark exhaustion, whether national, EEA-wide, or
international, there are no doubts that they will use and misinterpret the ECJ
statements to their advantage in order to control the further commercialization
of their products in the internal market. Once again, it should be remembered
that the “specific subject matter” and the primary function of a trademark is
that of a source indicator. Consumer protection is the primary concern.
Protection of the trademark owner is a secondary concern. It is difficult to
draw the thin line that divides “legitimate use” and “illegitimate abuse” of
intellectual property rights when confronting trademark exhaustion.
However, it should not be forgotten that any abuse of trademark protection
will entail unwelcome consequences for the marketplace sooner or later.

238. Frits Loendersloot, 1997 E.C.R. at I-6227.

